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CONFERERNCE REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN COURTS
Deborah R. Gerstel and Adam G. Segall*
INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 1985, the International Human Rights Law Group
and the International Legal Studies Program of the American Univer-
sity, Washington College of Law co-sponsored a working conference on
the implementation of international human rights law in United States
courts.1 Some thirty-five scholars and practitioners of international law
attended the conference. These experts engaged in a candid and realis-
tic assessment of domestic human rights litigation to date, evaluating
successes and failures of various litigation strategies previously em-
ployed, and expressing thoughts on future action. The following is a
synopsis of the conference discussions.
The organizers divided the subject matter into three specific subfields
of international fiuman rights litigation. During their first session, par-
ticipants discussed human rights in American foreign policy. The gen-
eral themes emerging from this session included the effectiveness of
human rights statutes in shaping American foreign policy, adjudicatory
relief through access to domestic courts (of particular interest were the
issues of standing .and the political question doctrine), and the availa-
bility of alternative methods of promoting and enforcing human rights
in the domestic arena.
In the second session the conferees analyzed questions of interna-
tional human rights law in immigration cases. They focused on such
themes as the impact of international law in shaping issues of domestic
immigration law, the receptivity of administrative agencies to reliable
evidence regarding human rights abuses in foreign countries, and possi-
ble strategies to ensure United States compliance with international ob-
* Deborah R. Gerstel and Adam G. Segall were the rapporteurs for the conference.
Ms. Gerstel received her J.D. (August 1986), Washington College of Law, American
University; B.A. (1982), University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Segall received his J.D. (May
1986), Washington College of Law, American University; B.A. (1983). University of
Rochester.
1. The Conference Chairman was Steven M. Schneebaum, a partner in the law
firm of Patton, Boggs & Blow. Mr. Schneebaum chairs the Domestic Litigation Com-
mittee of the International Human Rights Law Group, and has been involved in the
preparation of amicus curiae briefs in a number of the major cases discussed during
the course of the day-long conference.
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ligations regarding refugee law.
In the third session, participants discussed attempts to use customary
international law in domestic courts. Debate centered on the success of
particular types of cases, the sufficiency of United States legal protec-
tions to assure redress of human rights violations, and the available
methods for challenging sovereign immunity and the Act of State de-
fense as applied by domestic courts.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY
The United States Congress has passed a number of statutory mea-
sures over the past several years in its attempt to inject human rights
considerations into American foreign policy. During the first session,
conference participants evaluated problems encountered by attorneys in
attempting to enforce this legislation in the courts.2
Obtaining effective relief from an adjudicatory body requires, fore-
most, the ability to have grievances heard. Consequently, a majority of
the debate and discussion centered on the barriers that litigants have
encountered in the pursuit of claims in United States federal courts.
While discussion focused primarily on the political question doctrine,3
participants considered several other barriers, including dismissal by
equitable discretion based on the difficulty of the fact finding inherent
in alleged violations outside the country, the limitations on the type of
relief that can be granted, and the unavailability of a statutory private
right of action in many circumstances. Each of these barriers has pre-
vented adjudication of the merits of cases involving international
human rights issues by denying entry, at a threshold level, into the do-
2. David Weissbrodt was the discussion leader for the first session. Mr. Weissbrodt
is Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.
3. The most authoritative and commonly cited formulation of the political question
doctrine is that of Justice Brennan in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; (2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it; (3) or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; (6) or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.
Id. at 217. If one of these conditions is inextricable from the case at bar, the adjudica-
tion of the case may be said to require the resolution of a political question that is
nonjusticiable and hence not reviewable by the court.
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mestic courts.
The principal case the conferees reviewed was Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, in which a group of congressmen, aliens, and private domestic
plaintiffs delineated a number of constitutional and statutory claims in
challenge to United States policy in Nicaragua., Applying the test laid
down in Baker v. Carr,6 the district court in Sanchez exercised its equi-
table discretion and dismissed each of the federal claims as nonjusticia-
ble under the political question doctrine.7 Although the plaintiffs in
4. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affid, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
5. Id. at 596. The complaint listed twenty-six plaintiffs: twelve non-resident aliens,
citizens of Nicaragua; twelve members of Congress; and two residents of Florida who
sued on behalf of that state. The district court grouped the causes of action together
into three broad categories of claims for relief. Id. at 598.
Only the congressional plaintiffs' actions were discussed in this segment of the con-
ference. The congressional plaintiffs alleged that the United States has been sponsor-
ing, and continues to sponsor, raids against towns and villages in Nicaragua. They
alleged that paramilitary activities are financed and carried out by the United States
government, its agents and employees, against the people of Nicaragua in an attempt
to overthrow their national government. Id. The congressional plaintiffs alleged that
these activities constitute acts of war which have not been authorized by Congress pur-
suant to Article I, § 8, cl. 11 of the Constitution and violate the so-called neutrality
laws set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 956-60 (1982). Id. Section 960 states:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military
or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the terri-
tory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or
people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned.
Id.
The twelve legislators also alleged a violation of the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. § 1541 (1982), which states:
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Consti-
tution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
Id.
Further, the congressional plaintiffs also brought suit under the Boland Amendment
to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 97-377 § 793, 96
Stat. 1865 (codified at 37 U.S.C. § 308 (1982) (prohibiting the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense from using any of the funds provided in the
Act for military activities aimed at overthrowing the government of Nicaragua).
The Congressmen sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop an alleged un-
declared war waged by the federal defendants against the people and government of
Nicaragua. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd,
770 F.2d 202, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
6. Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
7. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601-02 (D.D.C. 1983). The dis-
trict court in Sanchez found that it lacked judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving the dispute and that it could not find the claims justiciable without
1986]
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Sanchez had argued that violations of several United States laws were
continuing to occur, the court never considered the merits of these ar-
guments. Conference participants generally agreed that such grounds
for dismissal as were employed in Sanchez are arbitrary, and too often
merely provide a convenient way for the courts to avoid certain difficult
or sensitive cases.
It was suggested that the plaintiffs in Sanchez may have decreased
their chance of success by arguing too many different statutory bases
for their claims. The district court was able to sidestep completely the
argument that Sanchez presented qualified alien plaintiffs with pre-
sumed rights of action in a tort suit under the Alien Tort Statute by
reference to the nonjusticiability of the claims under the War Powers
Resolution, 9 Neutrality laws,10 and the Boland Amendment. 1 Several
participants criticized the attempt to obtain standing through the use of
these other statutes as a strategic failure. Instead of forcing the court
to evaluate the alleged tortious acts, this approach focused judicial at-
tention on the alternate bases for standing and jurisdiction asserted. In
addition, it was noted that within the framework of the Alien Tort
Statute the alien plaintiffs could have made better use of international
human rights law to obtain relief.
Conference participants assessed the impact of Sanchez relative to
expressing a lack of respect due coordinate branches of government. Id. at 600. The
court determined that it must take special care when confronted with a challenge to the
validity of United States foreign policy initiatives, to pay appropriate deference to deci-
sions of the political branches. In sum, the court decided to exercise its equitable dis-
cretion to dismiss the legislators' claims, noting that the proper forum for such policy
determinations was not in the courtroom, but in the Congress. Id.
The Nicaraguan plaintiffs sought monetary and equitable relief for injuries caused
by the alleged U.S.-sponsored terrorist raids. Id. at 598. They maintained that these
raids violate fundamental human rights established under international law and the
United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief prohibiting fur-
ther U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua. Id. The court decided that the allegations
of these nonresident aliens presented a nonjusticiable political question based on an-
other Baker v. Carr standard: the potential of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments. Id. at 600. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed
the lower court decision on other grounds. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). The Circuit Court used the political question doctrine to deny relief only on
the issue of the congressional appellants' claim that assisting the Contras is tantamount
to waging war. Id. at 210. They argued that the defendants' actions deprived Congress
of its right under art. I, § 8, cl. 11 of the Constitution to participate in the decision to
declare war. Id. The court, citing Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
held that this activity presented a nonjusticiable political question.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
9. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 956 (1982).
I. 37 U.S.C. § 308 (1982).
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the judicial decision in Crockett v. Reagan,2 in which twenty-nine con-
gressional plaintiffs focused on alleged violations of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act s and the War Powers Resolution1 4 in attempting to chal-
lenge United States economic and military assistance to El Salvador.
The government defendants in Crockett argued that legislation sup-
porting previous executive actions had estopped challenges to the ade-
quacy of executive certifications regarding the circumstances in El Sal-
12. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 720 F.2d. 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983). In Crockett, twenty-nine members of Congress brought suit against
President Reagan and other United States officials challenging the legality of the
United States military presence in, and military assistance to, El Salvador. The plain-
tiffs claimed that United States military officials had been introduced into situations in
El Salvador where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated by the
circumstances and, consequently, the President's failure to report to Congress violated
the War Powers Resolution. The plaintiffs also claimed that unilateral executive policy
violated the Congressional War Powers set forth in art. I, § 8 of the Constitution.
Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that violations of human rights by the government of
El Salvador were pervasive and that in the absence of a certification of "exceptional
circumstances" by the President, United States military assistance to El Salvador vio-
lated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
13. The plaintiffs cited two provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The
first, the Harkin Amendment, § 116, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1982) states in part:
No assistance may be provided ... to the government of any country which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of
persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such
assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.
Id.
The second provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relied upon is § 502B, 22
U.S.C. § 2304 (1982), which states in part: "[n]o security assistance may be provided
to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights. Security assistance may not be pro-
vided ...unless the President certifies in writing ... that extraordinary circum-
stances exist warranting provision of such assistance." Id.
14. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982). Particularly, § 1543(a)
provides:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced: (1) into hostilities or into situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into
the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat,
except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or
training of such forces; or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United
States Armed Forces equipped for combat located in a foreign nation; the Presi-
dent shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth:
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed
Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such intro-
duction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
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vador. 1' As in Sanchez, the court in Crockett applied principles of
equitable discretion, holding that "whatever infirmities the President's
certification may or may not suffer, it is clear that under these circum-
stances plaintiffs' dispute is primarily with their fellow legislators who
have authorized aid to El Salvador while specifically addressing the
human rights issue, and who have accepted the President's
certifications."' 6
The consensus among conference participants was that there is little
possibility of successfully basing a suit on either the War Powers Reso-
lution or Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The barriers
presented, as illustrated in both Crockett and Sanchez, are considera-
ble. Another barrier to litigation besides the political question doctrine
is that of the standing of litigants in the first place to bring suit testing
the legality of United States foreign policy. The question of standing
turns first on whether there has been injury-in-fact to the party seeking
relief-the complainant must be within the zone of interests sought to
be protected by the law in question. Second, there must be a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated, in order to insure that the litigant is the proper party to re-
present the interests involved. This can be a major stumbling block in
human rights cases where often the courts find that United States
plaintiffs suffer at most only indirect injuries or that the causal rela-
tionship between the plaintiffs' claims and the challenged action is too
weak to support an adequate nexus.17 As a tactic to move beyond the
problem posed by standing, some participants urged greater reliance on
lawsuits in which human rights litigants would be the defendants. Such
"defensive lawsuits," it was agreed, could overcome the barrier of
standing and allow human rights litigants to contest matters of foreign
policy.
Turning from the barriers to litigation, participants launched into a
debate on the propriety and effectiveness of bringing actions where the
probability of a positive legal determination is doubtful. A wide range
15. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 896 (D.D.C. 1982). Defendants argued
that Congress had given tacit approval to the Presidential actions and cited the Inter-
national Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1982),
which specifically authorizes economic and military assistance to El Salvador, including
the assignment of members of the Armed Forces to El Salvador to carry out various
duties under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act. Id.
at 896.
16. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982).
17. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463-65 (1972). The appellate court, unlike the
district court, found that the complainants had standing. The appellate court, however,
went on to dismiss the complaint as non-justiciable. Id.
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of views existed on this issue. One perspective was that a strategy of
prolific litigation raises public awareness, forces recognition of interna-
tional law, and serves to educate the judiciary. The competing view-
point advocates a more selective strategy. Under this latter formula-
tion, careful selection among cases would help weed out frivolous suits
and concentrate limited legal resources.
There were several comments on the question of whether doubtful
suits should be used to achieve effective publicity. One participant ar-
gued that the goal of introducing and establishing human rights norms
in United States courts must be paramount. "Where the President is
aiding in the torture of others, we want the judiciary to be able to come
in against the President. The purpose of continuing lawsuits which may
be frivolous, therefore, is to attempt to bring the action into a legal
context. It is necessary to create a means for dialogue even if you know
you are going to lose." As an example, this participant cited the Green-
ham Women case,18 in which "it was understood that the case [seeking
an injunction against the deployment of cruise missiles in a town in
England] was unwinnable." Although held by the district court to pre-
sent a non-justiciable political question, Greenham Women proved ef-
fective in focusing media attention in Europe and the United States on
NATO's cruise missile deployment policy.
18. Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Greenham Women was an action brought by an association of British
women, a United States citizen living in England, and two United States Congressmen.
Id. at 1332. The association alleged that the deployment of cruise missiles contravened
customary norms of international law, subjecting the plaintiffs to tortious injury action-
able under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1334.
The United States citizen alleged that the deployment violated her right to life and
liberty under the fifth and ninth amendments of the United States Constitution. Id.
The congressional plaintiffs alleged that deployment violated their constitutional right
and responsibility as members of Congress to declare war and provide for the general
defense and welfare. Id. The court cited the standards of Baker v. Carr in applying the
political question doctrine to declare the controversy non-justiciable. Id. at 1335-39.
The opinion stated:
If the merits were reached, the court would have to determine whether the
United States, by deploying cruise missiles, is acting aggressively rather than
defensively, increasing significantly the risk of incalcuable death and destruction
rather than decreasing such risk and making war rather than promoting peace
and stability .... Questions like how to insure peace, how to promote prosper-
ity, what is a fair utilization and distribution of economic resources, are exam-
pies of questions that must be decided by the fair, sound, reasoned, and mature
judgements of men and women responsive to the common good. The power to
make these determinations is therefore appropriately allocated to the political
branches.
Id. at 1337-38.
The court concluded that the fact finding that would be necessary for a substantive
decision was unmanageable and beyond the competence and expertise of the judiciary.
Id. at 1338.
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There were many responses to this line of reasoning. One participant
stressed the need to adhere to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which bars attorneys from initiating proceedings with
knowledge that the case is frivolous.' 9 A distinction was raised, how-
ever, between cases which lack a sufficient legal basis and those which
merely appear "unwinnable" even though warranted by law. Another
participant contended that there is often little or no time to decide
whether to initiate an action. Therefore, consistent with ethical obliga-
tions, a practicing attorney has a duty to bring the suit if she holds the
conviction that the case is not frivolous in the first instance.
Several individuals feared that the law ultimately produced by the
initiation of doubtful cases could produce bad precedent. Confronted
with borderline cases, judges may create new barriers resulting in "bad
law" under which every human rights lawyer will then be obliged to
work. Despite the positive benefits of increased legal awareness, many
participants suggested that such "bad law" has a ripple effect ex-
tending to cases of all kinds brought before all adjudicatory bodies.
Query, how successful is a highly publicized case if the legal result
presents a new hurdle for future litigants? Under the Sanchez analysis,
for example, a broad range of questions formerly open for adjudication
might now be considered non-justiciable under the broad "political
question" doctrine. If the primary goal of those who brought the suit
was simply to direct public and media attention to the situation in Nic-
aragua, one participant argued that Congressional trips to Nicaragua
could have produced a positive dramatic effect without creating bad
legal precedent.
Another participant recounted a discussion he had with attorneys for
the plaintiffs in a suit which had yielded a significant setback for
human rights case law. Most human rights activists regarded the par-
ticular case, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,20 as a disaster from
the outset. When asked why they intended to file for certiorari with the
Supreme Court in light of the damaging opinion they had received be-
low, the attorneys stated that their sole duty was to their clients. Had
the petition been granted, negative review by the Supreme Court could
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
20. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (citing and discussing Tel-Oren).
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have increased substantially the damage done. Upon reflection, this
participant asserted that the ethical obligations of attorneys extend be-
yond their clients; they also owe a duty to the proper development of
the law. If the possibility arises that a case may create a negative result
in the body of law, participants suggested that attorneys should at least
inform their clients of that consideration.
Discussion shifted next to a consideration of appropriate legal, politi-
cal, administrative, and educational strategies to be employed in the
future. Participants deemed publicity of human rights issues to be es-
sential, but not at any cost. There was a general consensus that attor-
neys must consider the most efficient use of limited resources in decid-
ing whether to litigate. (Conferees returned to this theme throughout
the day.) Participants noted that in the 1940's and 1950's the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People was the "only show
in town" deeply involved in civil rights litigation. As a consequence, the
NAACP could carefully select cases to be litigated, with a coordinated,
long-term strategy in mind. By contrast, many groups and individual
practitioners involved in human rights cases today simply do not agree
on strategy. They respond to different constituencies and different con-
cepts of legal ethics and moral obligations. It is essential, participants
stressed, that these groups and individuals meet on a more regular ba-
sis to coordinate their legal efforts and to consider how their respective
suits may affect one another.
An exchange between two conference participants, who were each
involved at the time of the conference in immigration litigation in dif-
ferent parts of the country, brought this need for coordination into par-
ticularly sharp focus. Although one of the two cases could produce neg-
ative precedent for the other, the participant whose organization had
taken the first case explained that a number of political and strategic
reasons obliged his group to go forward with the suit.
To facilitate the proper selection and coordination of cases, many
conference participants agreed on the need to establish operative crite-
ria to distinguish between "hard" cases-those having a strong statu-
tory jurisdictional basis, a meritorious claim, and solid popular sup-
port-and "soft" cases-those which are not necessarily frivolous but
which have little chance of success and a high probability of an adverse
ruling. In selecting such hard cases, one must look to the degree to
which human rights practitioners can mobilize public opinion.
Participants discussed political options to expand access to the courts
in human rights cases throughout the session. They generally agreed
that an effective political strategy should take advantage of every pub-
lic outcry against terrorism. One proposal called for legislation to facil-
1986]
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itate action on behalf of the family of Leon Klinghoffer, victim of the
Achille Lauro tragedy.2" The suggested legislation would create district
court jurisdiction and provide tort remedies for victims of foreign ter-
rorist acts to sue their perpetrators, but would likely be broad enough
to encompass a wide range of human rights violations.
In lieu of dramatic legislative reform, another participant called for
the increasing efforts aimed at recognition of existing international law.
For example, one strategy would be to declare terrorists hostes humani
generis and, therefore, subject them to universal criminal jurisdiction.
This could be accomplished by ratifying conventions which provide for
such jurisdiction and by more stringently enforcing extradition provi-
sions in existing treaties.22 The same legislation implementing these
conventions could provide the basis for legal action against violators,
without the need for drastic new statutory developments.
Some participants believed that the Senate would not approve new
jurisdictional legislation due to perceived judicial infringement on exec-
utive discretion in the conduct of United States foreign policy. There
was concern, moreover, that a floor debate in Congress on these issues
would produce adverse statements on international human rights law
and thereby provide new grounds for judges to justify dismissal of fu-
21. The Achille Lauro incident involved the taking of an Italian ship, allegedly by
Palestinian Liberation Organization affiliates, off the coast of Egypt on October 7,
1985. Passengers and crew were held hostage for hours, during the course of which
time an American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered. Wash. Post, June 19,
1986, at A27, col. 4.
22. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), opened for
signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related
Extortion That Are of International Significance, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, 27
U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft (Hijacking), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 10 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Instutitions and Practices Similar to Slav-
ery, opened for signature Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on Sept. 25,
1926, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No. 3532, 182
U.N.T.S. 51; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/181, at 174 (1948),
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 151 Brit. Foreign State Papers 682; Convention to Suppress the
Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 2 Bevans 607,
60 L.N.T.S. 253; Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18,
1904, 35 Stat. 1979, T.S. No. 469, 1 Bevans 424, 1 L.N.T.S. 83.
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ture cases.23
As an alternative to court actions, various participants urged greater
concentration on administrative hearings as an effective means to influ-
ence. foreign policy. They noted that customs and trade statutes have
provided a particularly significant basis for successful administrative
proceedings. In the South African Coal Case,24 for example, petitioners
attacked a South African law that effectively obliged black miners to
work under contracts enforceable by penal sanctions. Petitioners argued
that the importation of coal mined under these circumstances violated a
statute that prohibits importing goods produced by indentured labor
into the United States. 25
Although the Commissioner of Customs Services dismissed this com-
plaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not satisfy a statutory pro-
viso fixing a domestic consumptive demand, 20 the South African gov-
ernment subsequently repealed all of its penal servitude laws.27 While
the Commissioner of Customs Services found that the plaintiffs had not
satisfied statutory provisions and therefore dismissed the complaint, the
hearing did create favorable press, helped to define such terms as in-
dentured labor, and may actually have induced South Africa to change
its policy vis-A-vis the rights of workers.
The conference produced similar comments with respect to a case
pending before the United States Court of International Trade, in
which the plaintiffs were seeking to exclude various Soviet products
23. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (commenting on the need for
judicial education in areas of international law).
24. Importation of Coal From the Republic of South Africa Case, Treasury Dep't,
U.S. Cust. Serv., Res. 3-R:E:R 703971 T (1975). This was a 1975 proceeding brought
by the United Mine Workers and the State of Alabama under § 307 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982). before the Commissioner of Customs to prevent the
release of South African coal being imported by Gulf Power, a utility company.
Butcher, Southern African Issues in United States Courts, 26 How. LJ. 601, 616
n.50 (1983).
25. The relevant test of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 reads:
All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured
wholly or in part in any foreign county by convict labor and/or forced labor and/
or indentured labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to enter at any of
the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited,
and the Secretary of Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regu-
lations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision.
Id.
26. Id. Section 1307 provides that "in no case shall such provisions be applicable to
goods wares, articles, or merchandise so mined, produced, or manufactured which are
not mined, produced, or manufactured in such quantities in the United States as to
meet the consumptive demands of the United States."
27. The repeal was set out in § 51 of the Second General Law Amendment Act of
1974 (Act No. 94 of 1974). Butcher, Southern African Issues in United States Courts,
26 How. L.J. 601, 623, n.73 (1983).
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from the United States under the Tariff Act of 1930.28 Both Customs
and Treasury Department officials have argued before the International
Trade Commission that it is impossible to tell whether the U.S.S.R.
uses forced labor to manufacture specific products imported into the
United States. For that reason, it was suggested, the proceeding before
the United States Court of International Trade will highlight the need
for more effective enforcement of Congressionally-mandated trade
sanctions against countries that do not respect labor and workers'
rights.
Beyond the customs and trade statutes, one participant suggested
that attorneys in the human rights field should examine a broad array
of administrative provisions and procedures. As an example, she noted
one case in which an administrative action brought under the Marine
Mammals Protection Act 29 reinforced United States policy towards
Namibia. The conference participants concluded that increased concen-
28. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982). See pending case derived from
McKinney v. United States Department of the Treasury, No. 85-73 (Ct. Int'l Trade
July 23, 1985). The plaintiffs in this proceeding were members of Congress, a share-
holder, a labor union, and five organizations seeking to exclude from entry into the
United States various products mined, produced, or manufactured in the Soviet Union
allegedly by convict, forced, or indentured labor under the Trade Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).
The Court of International Trade held that all plaintiffs lacked standing except those
plaintiffs who, in their personal capacities as workers or producers in industries compet-
ing with Soviet forced labor goods, suffered injury. Further, the court stated that the
Secretary of the Treasury's 1985 decision rendered this action moot. The Secretary had
determined that:
The available evidence, including the International Trade Commission Report
and further information from the Central Intelligence Agency provides no rea-
sonable basis to establish a nexus between Soviet forced labor practices and spe-
cific imports from the Soviet Union; there presently is no basis upon which to
prohibit importation into the United States of any goods produced within the
Soviet Union.
Id.
The constitutional limitation of the federal judicial power to cases in controversy re-
quires dismissal of an action as moot "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
29. In re Fouke Co. to Waive the Moratorium on the Importation of Cape Fur Seal
Skins, Doc. MMPAH No. 1, National Marine Fisheries Serv., Dept. of Commerce
(1975). In this administrative hearing, the Chairman of a House Foreign Affairs sub-
committee, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and others intervened directly
to challenge an application to waive a moratorium on the importation of cape fur seal
skins harvested in Namibia. The State Department's view that the importation of
Namibian seal skins would be inconsistent with treaty obligations and contrary to U.S.
foreign policy interests led to a decision by the Director of the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service to enforce the moratorium.
Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Butcher, Southern
African Issues in United States Courts, 26 How. L.J. 601, 623-28 (1983) (discussing
Diggs and related cases).
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tration on administrative hearings is a significant means by which to
influence national policy. This approach, they generally agreed, may
also lay the foundation for later successful litigation.
Finally, participants reached a consensus on the fundamental role of
legal scholarship in enhancing the opportunities for successful domestic
litigation of international human rights questions. Such scholarship is
essential in raising the consciousness of the judiciary, and may in fact
be a more effective way to educate judges than expending legal re-
sources and talent on numerous lawsuits. Participants suggested that
legal scholarship can also help practitioners anticipate the kinds of
cases likely to arise in the future, and appropriate responses to those
cases.
II. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW IN IMMIGRATION CASES
During the second session, conference participants addressed a num-
ber of questions concerning the use of international standards in United
States immigration cases.30 Participants discussed issues of substantive
law as well as strategy with particular emphasis placed on cases involv-
ing refugees fleeing from armed conflicts in Latin America.
A. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
A substantial number of recent immigration cases litigated in the
United States have involved refugees from countries torn by civil wars
and internal strife such as El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Certain
practitioners have attempted to base defenses to deportation on the Ge-
neva Conventions,31 as well as on the customary international law re-
30. Arthur C. Helton of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights was the dis-
cussion leader for the second session.
31. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as First Geneva Convention of 1949]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Second Geneva Convention of 1949];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Third Geneva
Convention of 1949]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter cited as Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949] [all four hereinafter col-
lectively cited as Geneva Conventions of 1949]. See generally Conference, The Ameri-
can Red Cross - Washington College of Law Conference: International Humanitarian
and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 83
(1983) (discussing the implementation and enforcement of humanitarian law and
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lated to armed conflicts.32 Although the recent decision of Immigration
Judge Horn in In re del Carmen Medina33 may have created a "toe-
hold" for the use of the Geneva Conventions in U.S. immigration pro-
ceedings, conference participants raised a series of doubts as to whether
the terms of the Conventions actually apply in those cases.
Participants noted that the Geneva Conventions apply in their en-
tirety only to international armed conflicts. 4 The various implementing
and enforcement provisions of the Conventions do not, therefore, neces-
sarily apply to non-international armed conflicts taking place within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party. For example, the duty not
to transfer persons to a country wherein they may have reason to fear
persecution for their political opinions or religious beliefs explicitly ex-
tends only to "protected persons. ''3 6 As specifically defined by the Ge-
neva Conventions, 8 this category of "protected persons" does not in-
clude a State Party's own nationals. Accordingly, these provisions of
the Geneva Conventions appear inapplicable to U.S. immigration cases
involving refugees from non-international armed conflicts.3 7 A poten-
tially useful provision of the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings
is common article 3.38 Among all the provisions of the Conventions,
only common article 3 explicitly guarantees the respect of fundamental
human rights in non-international armed conflicts. Due to its special
nature, common article 3 is also regarded as self-executing and creates
enforceable rights under its own terms, wholly apart from the other
terms of the Geneva Conventions. 9
human rights law in non-international armed conflicts).
32. Parker, Geneva Convention Protection for Salvadoran Refugees, 13 Immigra-
tion Newsletter 1, 6-7 (May-June 1984).
33. In re del Carmen Medina, No. A26 949 415 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Exec. Of-
fice for Immigration Rev., Harlingen, Tex. July 25, 1985) (order for deportation).
34. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 31, at art. 2. As article 2 is identical
in all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it is generally referred to as "common
article 2."
35. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 31, at art. 45(4).
36. Id. at art. 4(1).
37. Id. at art. 45.
38. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 31, at art. 3. As article 3 is identical
in all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it is generally referred to as "common
article 3."
39. 1 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949, COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION 48 (J. Pictet ed., A. Delteney trans.
1960); Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U.L. REv.
9, 12 (1983).
The terms of common article 3 urge the parties to "endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Conven-
tion," but this is not mandatory in non-international conflict. Geneva Conventions of
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As one participant noted, however, in order to invoke common article
3 as a contractual obligation in United States immigration proceedings,
one must argue that common article 3 imposes legal obligations on
states playing no acknowledged role in the conflict in question. In addi-
tion, in the view of this participant, despite any objective determination
that domestic hostilities have risen to the level of an "armed conflict"
for the purposes of common article 3, the enforcement of the rights
guaranteed by that article rests solely with the country in which the
conflict occurs. Another participant observed that in the case of El Sal-
vador, the United Nations has indicated that it regards common article
3 as applying to the conflict in that country and since 1981, United
Nations organs have also classified the Salvadoran conflict as meeting
the higher threshold of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, 40 which
primarily relates to full-scale civil wars.41 Nonetheless, there is no con-
tractual obligation for State Parties involved in non-international
armed conflict to give effect to the articles of the Geneva Conventions
other than the substantive human rights provisions of common article
3, except by special agreement.42 Thus, the only remedy for the en-
forcement of common article 3 must be found in the parallel provisions
of human rights treaties.
Concluding that the Geneva Conventions, as presently interpreted,
apply to U.S. immigration cases only on a limited basis, the conference
participants briefly considered the utility of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and the Protocol to that instrument.' 3 They fo-
1949, supra note 31, at common art. 3.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 (Protocol II),
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442-49 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Protocol II]. The application of Protocol II is limited to armed conflicts
between a High Contracting Party and other armed forces that are "under responsible
command [and] exercise such control over part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol."
Id. at art. 1(1).
41. The scope of Protocol II is further defined in article 1(2) which provides: "This
Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
being armed conflicts." Protocol II, supra note 40, at art. 1(2).
42. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing common article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949).
43. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for sig-
nature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinaf-
ter cited as the Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter cited as the Refugee Protocol]. The Refugee Convention, never signed
by the United States, covers only those persons who became refugees because of events
prior to 1 January 1951. The Refugee Protocol, acceded to by the United States on I
November 1968, binds states to apply articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention
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cused primarily on the 1985 holding in Haitian Refugee Center v.
Gracey.44 In that case, the court held that while the excluded alien
plaintiffs had standing to sue in federal court, the complaint based
upon the Refugee Protocol failed to state a claim for which relief could
be granted. Therefore, the nonbinding protocol did not afford any
rights to Haitians so as to preclude their interdiction by the United
States officials on the high seas. While several of those at the confer-
ence regarded the Gracey decision as a major setback in the effort to
expand reliance on the Refugee Convention, one participant pointed
out that there was little novel about the Gracey ruling; courts have
repeatedly issued unfavorable opinions regarding the Refugee Conven-
tion and the Protocol."5
to refugees regardless of the date of the events leading to their becoming refugees.
Refugee Protocol, supra at art. I.
44. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985) (chal-
lenging the interdiction by U.S. officials of visaless aliens on the high seas). Executive
Order No. 12324, dated September 29, 1981, ordered the Secretary of State to enter
into cooperative arrangements with foreign governments to prevent illegal immigration
into the U.S. Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). The Secretary
of Transportation was also ordered to issue instructions to the Coast Guard in order to
enforce the suspension of undocumented aliens and interdiction of any vessel carrying
such aliens. Id. Vessels covered in this order are vessels of foreign nations with which
the U.S. has arrangements. Id.
The Executive Order directed the Coast Guard to return the vessels and their pas-
sengers to the country from which they came, when there was reason to believe that an
offense has been committed against the U.S. immigration laws, or laws of a foreign
country with which the U.S. had an arrangement. Id. at 48,109-10. No person deemed
a refugee was returned without his consent. Id.
The U.S. and Haiti entered into a cooperative arrangement to prevent the illegal
immigration of undocumented Haitians into the U.S. by sea. The arrangements permit-
ted U.S. authorities to board Haitian vessels to inquire about the condition and destina-
tion of the vessels, and the status of those on board. If a violation of U.S. or Haitian
law was discovered, the vessel could be returned to Haiti. Any Haitian who qualified
for refugee status would not be returned to Haiti. The Government of Haiti agreed that
any returned Haitians would not be prosecuted. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v.
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1405 (D.D.C. 1985).
45. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that
the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees did not afford
unadmitted Haitian aliens any rights in seeking parole beyond those granted under the
Immigration laws of the U.S.); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1288-90 (5th
Cir. 1977) (rejecting the contention that the Protocol invests Haitian aliens with a
liberty right protectable by due process or other constitutional protections; the Court
noted that "the intent of Congress in acceding to the Protocol was to leave existing
immigration precedures intact"); Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), affd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911
(1975) (holding that "the history of the adoption of the Protocol by this country makes
clear that all the individuals and institutions involved in that process had a continuing
belief that the Convention would not alter or enlarge the effect of existing immigration
laws, chiefly because it was felt that our immigration laws already embodied the princi-
ples of the Convention").
See Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee Act,
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Among the various rights accorded refugees by the Protocol is the
important one of nonrefoulement.'O While article 33 is generally under-
stood to preclude deportation of refugees based on a "well-founded
fear" of persecution in the state they fled, the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service has interpreted this treaty obligation more restric-
tively and withheld deportation only where a refugee can show a "clear
probability" of such persecution. In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Stevic,"' the Supreme Court upheld the INS interpretation
and found no merit in the "argument that this construction is inconsis-
tent with the Protocol." 49
Conference participants discussed efforts to establish a higher stan-
dard of nonrefoulement than the "clear probability" standard approved
in Stevic. Reference to customary principles of international law, it was
suggested, holds out greater promise in domestic immigration cases
than does invocation of treaty obligations.8 0 Wide agreement existed
that the deportation of Salvadorans, for example, constituted a viola-
tion of customary principles of human rights and humanitarian law.
Rather than confronting the various hurdles discussed above regarding
the invocation of the Geneva Conventions and other treaties as specifi-
cally binding in particular cases, more than one participant recom-
mended reference to these treaties simply as examples and evidence of
customary international norms.8 1 It was noted that judges, scholars,
and practitioners in a variety of countries had assessed a proposed the-
ory under which the mere existence of an armed conflict created a
prima facie right to universal asylum for persons fleeing the conflict,
32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117 (1983-84) (proposing that the provisions of the Refugee
Protocol are self-executing and enforceable).
46. Article 33(1) provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra
note 43, at art. 33(1).
47. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 401, 429-30
(1984) (holding that an alien seeking relief from deportation because he would be per-
secuted upon his return must "establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid de-
portation"); See Note, The Alien's Burden of Proof Under Section 243(h): How Clear
is Clear Probability?. 17 IND. L. REv. 581, 585-88 (1984) (discussing generally the
INS criteria).
48. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic 467 U.S. 401 (1984).
49. Id. at 428 n.22.
50. See generally Perluss & Hartmen, Temporary Refuge.: Emergence of a Cus-
tomary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986) (discussing the existence of a norm of
temporary refuge as a customary humanitarian norm rather than an extension of refu-
gee law).
51. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the use of treaties as
proof of customary international law).
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and had rejected it as an overbroad construction of the law.
Several comments addressed the remedy of extended voluntary de-
parture through which a deportable alien may be permitted to extend
his stay in the United States . 2 Inasmuch as the relevant code provi-
sions authorize extended voluntary departure not only on the basis of
individual circumstances but also on broad nationality grounds, this
remedy would seem to comprise an important source of relief for refu-
gees threatened with deportation. It was noted, however, that the
United States has granted extended voluntary departure on nationality
grounds only on a limited basis.53
One conference participant offered a two-part explanation for the
United States refusal to apply the same nationality criteria to the cases
of aliens from El Salvador as applied to aliens from other countries.
First, the government fears that offering a blanket remedy of extended
voluntary departure in the case of Salvadorans would invite a deluge of
applications not conceivable, for simple reasons of geography, from a
country such as Poland. Furthermore, from a political standpoint, the
Administration wants Salvadorans to remain in their country to help
fight the war against the rebels.
It was acknowledged that the opinions of immigration attorneys play
no role in State Department decisions regarding the granting of this
particular remedy. The provisions for extended voluntary departure
theoretically provide an important means of relief for refugees. As a
practical matter, conference participants concluded that as long as the
application of this remedy remains solely at the discretion of the Attor-
ney General~and the State Department,55 the option of extended vol-
untary departure will not exist in many cases.
B. LITIGATION STRATEGIES
Conference participants attempted to look behind the restrictive judi-
52. Federal regulations provide that the immigration judge may authorize the sus-
pension of an alien's deportation; if the alien also establishes that he is willing and able
to leave the U.S. the alien may file for an extension of time which to deport voluntarily.
This decision is within the sole jurisdiction of the district director. 8 C.F.R. § 244
(1986).
53. Under established procedures, the Department of State recommends to the
Justice Department which countries should receive this special status. As of February
1986, the only countries to have this status were Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Poland, and
Uganda.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982): "[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immi-
gration and naturalization of aliens." Id.
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing State Department proce-
dure regarding extended voluntary departure).
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cial attitude vis-.-vis international law often encountered in immigra-
tion cases. In so doing, certain participants laid the blame for this situ-
ation not with the judiciary, but with the faulty strategy of
practitioners who come before it. Attorneys involved in immigration
cases, it was remarked, often refrain from citing international law in
their arguments. Attorneys are often concerned that judges will not be
familiar with international standards and will therefore be confused by
and uncomfortable with their invocation. For that reason, attorneys fre-
quently raise international norms almost as an afterthought, thereby
contributing to a denigrating judicial attitude toward this body of law.
Particularly when cases raise questions as to the self-executing nature
of treaties, many attorneys automatically assume that arguments based
on international law will fail. In essence, they engage in a self-censor-
ing process before the arguments are even raised. One participant ar-
gued that by not forcefully asserting claims based on international law
where applicable, these immigration lawyers may in fact be guilty of
malpractice in the representation of their clients.
It was also noted, however, that some attorneys in immigration cases
"throw in international law" on too casual a basis. These practitioners
use references to international law simply as boilerplate language to
supplement their other arguments without careful consideration of the
substance of the asserted international claims and their relative merits
in each individual case. These practitioners may be equally culpable in
providing the basis for a skeptical judicial approach to international
law claims in immigration and asylum cases.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Conference participants noted that questions of immigration law are
commonly raised not before the courts, but before those administrative
tribunals designated by Congress as having exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over deportation and asylum cases. 56 This fact has yielded both
positive and negative consequences. To the detriment of practitioners
and their clients, one participant reiterated, domestic administrative
law offers no relief to those refugees who fear returning to face an
armed conffict, but only to those who will confront individualized perse-
cution. In addition, several participants pointed out that administrative
law judges in immigration cases are given only narrow authority and
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982) (noting the procedure prescribed by the immi-
gration laws shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final
orders of deportation heretofore made against aliens within the U.S. pursuant to ad-
ministrative proceedings).
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are reluctant to look beyond the relevant statute and regulations to
broader questions of international law. On the positive side, proceed-
ings before an administrative tribunal generally offer the opportunity to
raise issues from a defensive posture, easing the burden a petitioner
would encounter in an affirmative suit.
III. THE USE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC COURTS
During its third session of the day, the conferees focused on ques-
tions unique to the invocation of customary international law in United
States courts.57 Participants noted certain advantages to basing claims
on customary international law in domestic litigation. Perhaps most
significantly, reference to customary law avoids the often confusing
self-executing/non-self-executing distinction presented when dealing
with treaties.58 In addition, the Supreme Court has expressly recog-
nized the binding nature of customary international law on United
States courts through the doctrine of incorporation. 9
The discussion leader identified two principal types of cases in which
plaintiffs have alleged violations of customary international norms as a
basis for a cause of action. After analyzing the history and potential for
legislative reform of the statutory bases for these cases, participants
turned to a consideration of the general problems of proving customary
57. Joan Hartman, Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of
Law, was the discussion leader for the third session.
58. The self-executing/non-self-executing distinction was outlined by the Supreme
Court in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829):
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself, without aid of any legislative provision. But when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties en-
gages to perform a particular act-the treaty addresses itself to the political, not
the judicial department; and the Legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the court.
Id. at 314.
59. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In The Paquele Habana, the U.S.
Supreme Court made clear that customary international law is a part of U.S. federal
law and "incorporated" therein to the extent that it is not in conflict with domestic
statutory or common law. In ruling that principles of customary international law
should be controlling in evaluating the legality of the seizure of a Cuban fishing vessel
by a U.S. blockade squadron, the Court noted:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for determination. For this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.
id. at 700.
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international law.
A. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The first category of cases considered were those in which plaintiffs
relied upon the Alien Tort Statute0 as the jurisdictional basis for their
claim. Section 1350 provides that the "district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." '
The landmark decision in Filartiga v. Peha-Irala0 2 represented a major
step forward in the application of this statute. In Filartiga, the Second
Circuit found that torture carried out under color of governmental au-
thority constitutes a violation of customary norms of international law
as recognized by all countries. The court ruled that this "violation of
the law of nations" satisfied the jurisdictional threshold set by the
Alien Tort Statute.63
The optimism created by the Filartiga ruling was tempered signifi-
cantly by the decision handed down four years later in Tel-Oren v. Lib-
yan Arab Republic.6 4 The circuit court's ruling was comprised of three
separate opinions, each indicating different reasons for dismissing a
claim brought under the Alien Tort Statute. Principal attention, how-
ever, has focused on Judge Bork's opinion, which stated that the law of
nations must explicitly confer a private right of action, independent of
the 1789 jurisdictional statute, for a federal court to afford redress to
an injured alien plaintiff. The Tel-Oren holding has raised considerable
doubt concerning any expanded application of this statute in the fu-
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
61. Id.
62. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Filartiga involved a suit
brought under § 1350 by two citizens of the Republic of Paraguay against a
Paraguayan government official who was present in the United States on a visitor's
visa. The Filartigas, self-described opponents of the Stroessner regime in Paraguay,
alleged that Pefia-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, had
kidnapped and tortured to death Joelito Filartiga, their son and brother.
63. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
ried, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985). Tel-Oren involved a tort action for compensatory and
punitive damages, brought by the survivors and representatives of persons murdered in
an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel. The suit, brought in U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, named as defendants the Libyan Arab Republic, the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Information Office, the National Associa-
tion of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America. The complaint
charged the defendants with committing multiple tortious acts in violation of the law of
nations, treaties of the United States and criminal laws of the United States, as well as
common law. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Plaintiffs appealed.
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ture.65 An array of international law experts have roundly criticized
Judge Bork's opinion.66 Notwithstanding Tel-Oren, conference partici-
pants concurred that the rule of Filartiga remains intact, even if cir-
cumscribed. In all likelihood, a federal court will follow the Filartiga
decision in the next case with a similar fact pattern brought under the
Alien Tort Statute. It was generally assumed that suits which attempt
to extend the Second Circuit reasoning far beyond that scenario will
almost certainly encounter difficulties in the federal courts.67
Several individuals emphasized the significant impact of contempo-
rary political considerations on the development of section 1350 case
law. One participant contended that in the Filartiga case, for example,
the Department of Justice was initially reluctant to file a brief in sup-
port of the plaintiff, due to fear of retaliation by other countries. The
Justice Department overcame this reluctance only at the prompting of
the Department of State.
Similarly, one conference participant suggested that sensitivity to the
current political climate could again produce major improvements in
the body of case law. In particular, a tort suit brought against the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization by the family of Leon Klinghoffer and
aliens held hostage on board the Achille Lauro would present a fact
65. See infra note 74 (discussing order of court vacating its judgment that jurisdic-
tion was proper under the Alien Tort Statute in Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-
1772 RMT (MCx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984)).
66. See D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of
the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 94-105 (1985) (ar-
guing that Judge Bork blurred the concepts of "cause of action" and "jurisdiction" in
his Tel-Oren opinion, thereby allowing him to achieve his desired result of a narrow
and restrictive interpretation of international law); Gross, After Tel-Oren: Should Fed-
eral Courts Infer a Cause of Action Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 3 DicK. J.
INT'L L. 281-313 (1985) (arguing that Judge Bork ignored the statements of the Filar-
tiga court in coming to the erroneous conclusion that no private right of action exists
under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
67. One conference participant suggested that aside from the naming of a govern-
ment defendant, the United States, the case of Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985), was factually on point with Filartiga. While this individual of-
fered the analogy as proof of the uncertain status of the Filartiga rule and the arbi-
trary application of the Alien Tort Statute, others could point to the Sanchez decision
as a demonstration of the above thesis. Under this analysis, the Sanchez case did not
produce an inconsistent application of section 1350; it simply tried to stretch the rule of
Filartiga too far. Even in his opinion in Sanchez, Judge Scalia indicated that he did
not necessarily disagree with the rule of Filartiga, but simply found it inapplicable to
the case at hand:
Assuming, however, that the Alien Tort Statute covers state acts as well, then it
embraces this suit only insofar as the federal appellees are sued in their offical
capacities-i.e., to the extent that appellants are seeking to hold them to account
for, or to prevent them from implementing in the future, actions against the
United States.
Id. at 207 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
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pattern similar to that considered in Tel-Oren. National outrage at the
brutal murder of an American in a wheelchair, however, might produce
sufficient pressure to yield a markedly different result.
Filartiga remains an exception to the general unwillingness of the
federal courts to hear cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute. The
courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction in Alien Tort cases primar-
ily because they have refused to recognize that the alleged tortious acts
constituted violations of universally recognized norms of international
law.68 Consequently, some participants argued that Congressional
amendments to the Alien Tort Statute would clarify the scope of ac-
tions redressable under the statute.
A lengthy discussion ensued over current initiatives in Congress to
bring about such reform. 69 Potential amendments discussed included
the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute to incorporate American as
well as alien plaintiffs; expansion of the definition of torts "committed
in violation of the law of nations" specifically to include torture, extra-
judicial killings, piracy and slave trading; extension of liability to any
person acting under color of state law; and a possible prerequisite ex-
haustion of administrative remedies. These legislative efforts, it was
68. Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 n.23. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
(1979) (air disaster, even if caused by willful negligence, does not violate law of na-
tions); Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960)
(denial of free access to harbor not a violation of international law); Huynh Thi Anh v.
Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978) (no discernible rule of international law gov-
erning child custody); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (eighth
commandment "Thou shalt not steal" not part of the law of nations); Abiodun v. Mar-
tin Oil Serv., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)
(breach of contract through fraud and deceit not a violation of international law); Co-
hen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 634 F.2d 318, 320 (5th
Cir. 1981) (neither conversion nor breach of fiduciary duty violates international lav);
Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (re-
fusal to pay life insurance proceeds not violation of law of nations); Lopes v. Reederei
Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 293-97 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (neither unseaworthiness
nor negligence constitutes tortious violation of international law). But see Abdul-
Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864-65 (D. Md. 1961) (mother's con-
cealment of daughter's name and Lebanese nationality, inclusion of daughter in her
Iraqi passport, and having her admitted to the United States thereunder were tortious
acts under the law of nations); cf. Nguyen Dayen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194,
1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (the illegal seizure, removal and detention of an
alien against his will in a foreign country would appear to be a tort in violation of the
law of nations).
69. Some of the proposals under consideration were the direct result of efforts by
private organizations, in particular the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights. Par-
ticipants also noted that staff people in one Senate office recently drafted a bill to revise
the Alien Tort Statute wholly on their own initiative, without prompting from any pub-
lic interest group, and characterized this as a hopeful sign of congressional support for
the Filartiga approach and its codification.
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urged, could open opportunities to expand the scope of the Alien Tort
Statute. A careful redefinition of statutory terms also may assist judges
to recognize that certain international human rights norms have
achieved the status of law. On the other hand, certain conference par-
ticipants voiced doubts as to the advisability of efforts to amend the
Alien Tort Statute. Adequate legislative history does not exist to ascer-
tain the original intent of the drafters in 1789,70 rendering section 1350
a broadly interpretable statute. A reopening of the question-an inevi-
table consequence as the amendment process would produce new legis-
lative history--could narrow rather than expand current judicial con-
struction of the statute. Of greatest concern to this second group of
participants was not the likelihood that legislative reform efforts would
fail, but that the process would produce potentially harmful floor de-
bate on the proper scope of judicial authority. In this pessimistic scena-
rio, the Congressional Record would yield a plethora of negative state-
ments regarding section 1350 and customary international law which
would be cited in all future cases based on the statute or on any other
international legal norm.
B. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The second category of cases discussed were those brought under the
Foreign Soverign Immunities Act7 (FSIA) to sue a foreign government
or one of its agencies or instrumentalities. Two recent cases, it was ob-
served, suggest that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may effec-
tively support causes of action based on gross violations of human
rights that clearly violate international law.7 2 In Siderman v. Argen-
tina,7 3 the court determined that notwithstanding the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, a foreign govern-
ment may be subject to a suit brought under the Alien Tort Statute
70. Cf. lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), in which Judge
Friendly characterized the Alien Tort Statute as "a kind of legal Lohengrin; although
it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, .... no one seems to know whence it
came. . . ." Id. at 1015.
71. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
72. In a pending case, Martin v. The Republic of South Africa, Transvaal Dep't of
Hosp. Services, 84 Civ. 9094 (CES) (S.D.N.Y. Filed Dec. 17, 1984), plaintiffs sought
federal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in support of a claim
by a black American dancer denied emergency medical treatment by two state-funded
hospitals in South Africa. Relying on customary international norms prohibiting racial
discrimination, the plaintiff argued that the denial of emergency medical treatment on
the basis of race constituted an egregious violation of international law, for which the
South African government should not be permitted to shield itself from liability.
73. Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx), (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28,
1984) (available June 26, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
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that alleged specific instances of torture authorized by the government.
The Republic of Argentina and one of its provinces were ordered to pay
$2.7 million in damages for.the torture of an Argentinian plaintiff now
residing in the United States . 4 The second case, Von Dardel v. Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, held that to interpret the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act as a bar to suits against foreign goverments
brought under the Alien Tort Statute would act pro tanto to repeal
that statute .7  Accordingly, the court entered a default judgement
against the U.S.S.R. for the unlawful seizure, imprisonment, and possi-
ble death of a Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, at the end of
World War II1 1
Several participants addressed the need for congressional amend-
ments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to create an explicit
exception to immunity whenever a state commits gross violations of
human rights. Such amendments could prove advantageous in cases in
which the United States cannot acquire in personam jurisdiction over
an individual defendant. In addition, it was suggested that these
amendments might clear up a good deal of confusion surrounding both
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Alien Tort Statute.
There were differing opinions as to which violations of human rights
should trigger an exclusion from the scope of sovereign immunity in the
74. The Court did hold, however, that the Act of State Doctrine applied to and
barred the plaintiffs' claims regarding the expropriation of property. Id.
In an order filed on March 7, 1985, Judge Takasugi vacated the default judgment
and dismissed the action based on a reconsideration of the issue of foreign sovereignimmunity. Order Vacating Default Judgment and Dismissing Action, Siderman v. Ar-
gentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) (copy on file in the
offices of The American University Journal of International Law and Policy). Judge
Takasugi noted that although the Alien Tort Statute arguably provides an exception to
foreign sovereign immunity, its silence on the subject should be interpreted according
to perceptions of the state of the immunity law at the time the statute was originally
enacted. Id. at 2. He noted that the case law of 1789 recognized foreign sovereign
immunity as absolute, "especially as to acts of sovereigns within their own geographic
territory." Id., citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812). Thus, Judge Takasugi reasoned that if Congress had intended the Alien Tort
Statute to embody an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, the statute would have
expressly provided for it. Id. at 3. With respect to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, Judge Takasugi held that none of its enumerated exceptions applied to this case.
Id. This interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute raises serious questions of the contin-
ued usefulness of this statute for aliens to enforce human rights claims against foreign
governments in the United States federal courts. It also supports the notion advanced
by the conference participants that a "gross violation of human rights" exception
should be codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
75. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C.
1985).
76. Id. at 254.
77- Id. at 263.
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event that an effort to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
proved successful. One participant suggested that the list of gross viola-
tions contained in the Draft Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States would provide a good starting point.78 Others felt
that the Restatement list was too short, and that codification of it
would severely limit practitioners in future cases.
C. PROBLEMS OF PROOF OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There was a general consensus among conference participants that
the most difficult problem involved in the invocation of customary in-
ternational law in domestic litigation is proving, to the satisfaction of
the court, that the particular principle in question has risen to the level
of a binding and universally accepted international norm. The court
may consider several factors to determine customary law.7 9 Participants
assessed the relative utility of each of these factors.
Courts will likely look to the practice of states in deciding whether a
standard has reached the level of customary international law. It was
observed that documentation of uniform practice of dozens of individ-
ual countries is a difficult process. Blatant exceptions to that uniformity
can pose major problems in the weighing of evidence of state practice.80
78. The Draft Restatement list reads as follows:
§ 702. Customary International Law of Human Rights. A state violates inter-
national law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) §
702 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1985).
79. In Filartiga, for example, the court examined the usage of nations, judicial
opinions, and the works of jurists (as sources of customary international law), to arrive
at its conclusion that official torture is a universal prohibition of the law of nations.
Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). In so doing, it found evi-
dence of the consensus of nations in the numerous international treaties and accords
decrying torture, and in the widespread adoption of domestic law opposing torture. Id.
at 883-84.
80. The court in Filartiga eliminated many evidentiary problems by ignoring the
impact of non-conforming state practice on the recognized customary norm outlawing
torture. Although the court recognized that many states practice torture, it concluded
that no state espouses a right to torture its citizens. Filartiga v. Pefia-irala, 630 F.2d
876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). Not all experts, however, have so lightly dismissed the signifi-
cance of non-conforming state practice, as this may indicate the absence among states
of a sense of legal obligation. See Comment, Custom and General Principles as
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Some participants argued that courts should not look to evidence of
actual state practice, but rather to that which states claim to recognize
as law: their respective statutes and constitutions. Other conference
participants felt that courts cannot legitimately ignore evidence of ac-
tual state practice. Most participants agreed, however, that when prof-
fering evidence of state practice, attorneys must also prove that such
practice reflects opinio juris sive necessitatis, the requirement that
states adhere to the norms out of a sense of legal obligation and not
merely as a result of convenience or custom. 81 Proof of customary in-
ternational law by treaty, it was suggested, presents fewer difficulties
for the judge and practitioner than does proof by reference to state
practice. One participant observed that citing treaties to which the
United States is not a party creates no problem in domestic litigation if
the treaties are offered as evidence of a level of consensus among states.
While some conference participants proposed that the more effective
route is to refer to the decisions of international human rights tribunals
relating to particular treaty provisions than to cite the treaties directly,
since these more clearly interpret standards, others noted that decisions
of international tribunals are, unfortunately, poorly indexed and not
easily accessible.
Conference participants observed that in proving some points of cus-
tomary law, questions arise as to the evidentiary value of United Na-
tions resolutions. The resolutions and decisions of other international
and regional organizations may also be cited as proof of evolving norms
of customary international law.
D. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION
Conference participants generally perceived domestic courts to be re-
Sources of International Law in American Federal Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751,
756, 764 (1982) (noting a more restrictive view objecting to the court's "casual treat-
ment of the problem of practice," and asserting that "it is clear that neither practice
without belief nor belief without the corresponding practice can constitute a rule of
customary international law."
81. The state actor must believe that its conduct is required by international law;
actual practice alone is not enough to establish customary international law.
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases
were sufficient to prove. . . [t]hat courts abstained from criminal prosecution of
foreign seamen for tortious acts in collision cases, it would merely show that
States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings,
and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if
such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain
would it be possible to speak of an international custom.
The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 10, at 28 (Judgment of Sept.
7).
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luctant to rule on customary international law questions because of
their tendency toward judicial restraint reinforced by judicial concern
over deciding issues relatively alien to the domestic jurisprudential ex-
perience. Consequently, participants focused on the need to educate
judges as to the existence of and the vital role to be played by custom-
ary international law. It was agreed that practitioners must take the
initiative to show judges where and how to define international custom-
ary norms. They must also support these arguments with substantial
and convincing evidence. Despite general agreement on the scope and
nature of the challenge, participants' views varied widely on the means
to be employed to accomplish this task.
One participant suggested that decisions of various European courts
should be invoked to define terms and demarcate specific customary
norms.82 Decisions of international courts may also help to demonstrate
the contours of customary norms. It was noted, however, that attorneys
must proceed cautiously with this approach, because certain European
countries take a rather restrictive view with regard to issues affecting
human rights.83
Other conference participants recommended increased use of briefs
amicus curiae to educate the judiciary. This strategy makes efficient
and effective use of legal resources while providing a broader base of
support for the preferred outcome. One participant also suggested that
amicus briefs present an opportunity to advocate broad developments
in the law rather than limiting the focus to the specific grievances of
one party. Alternatively, attorneys can use amicus briefs to concentrate
judicial attention on certain narrowly targeted issues. A practical prob-
lem with the increased use of amicus briefs, it was observed, is the
82. The Lawless Case, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTs, 474 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights), reprinted in 31 I.L.R. 290; R. v. Commissioner of Police,
(1983) Q.B. Div'l Ct., reported in THE TIMEs (London), May 28, 1983, CO/565/83
(available June 26, 1986, on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
83. As an example, one participant contended that much of the French criminal
code may violate customary international law. See, e.g., [C. PEN.] art. 12 (1810)
(amended 1959): "Every person sentenced to death will be decapitated."; C. PEN., art.
35: "Whenever loss of civil rights has been imposed as the principle punishment, the
judgement may also provide for jailing, but not to exceed five years. If the convict is a
foreign national, or a French citizen who has lost his citizenship, jailing shall always be
pronounced." C. PEN., art. 76: "Any French national shall be guilty of treason and
sentenced to death, if he knowingly has participated in an action of demoralization of
the army or nation aimed at prejudicing the national defense."; C. PEN, art. 132: "Any
person who counterfeits or debases gold or silver money or lawful currency in France,
or its importation into French territory, shall be punished by hard labor for life."; C.
PEN., art. 274: "Every person apprehended begging at a place where a public institution
for the prevention of begging exists shall be punished by jailing from three to six
months and shall, thereafter, be lodged in such institution."
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difficulty of locating appropriate litigation in progress in order to sub-
mit a brief in a timely fashion.
Conference participants concluded with a brief review of certain
evolving customary norms, and focused particularly on the question of
basing claims in domestic suits on developing international norms in
the area of economic and social rights. Price v. Cohen,8 which raised
the question of whether a right to subsistence existed under the four-
teenth Amendment, was cited as an example of a case in which evi-
dence of such customary norms might have proven useful. In cases such
as Price, it was urged, attorneys could use proof of international norms
to persuade judges to employ higher standards of review, or to en-
courage an affirmative finding that the particular right is of a funda-
mental and absolute nature.85
Some participants cautioned, however, that economic and social
rights are not as clearly recognized as civil and political rights. Very
little customary international law on economic and social rights exists.
Where customary norms do exist, they are often very narrowly
construed.
In addition, when asking a judge to consider a customary social or
economic norm, an attorney must prove both the existence of the norm
and its relationship to the domestic right sought. By clearly defining
the nexus between customary international norms and domestic legal
rights, human rights practitioners will educate the judiciary and signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood that such arguments will succeed in
United States federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The Law Group organizers and the particpants in general felt that
the American University conference was a great success. Its value was
84. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983). In 1982, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture passed a law in effect prohibiting persons between the ages of 18 and 45 from
acquiring general year-round welfare relief unless they come within the specific cate-
gory of being chronically needy. The plaintiffs were denied year-round relief on the
grounds that they were declared to be transitionally needy. The plaintiffs alleged that
the Pennsylvania law discriminates impermissibly on the basis of age. Id. at 91. The
court, however, held that the Pennsylvania law did not violate the plaintiffs' fourteenth
amendment rights because the legislature was furthering a legitimate state interest. Id.
at 96.
85. The fundamental nature of social and economic rights is illustrated by the In-
ternational Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring that parties to the Convention recog-
nize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living including food, clothing,
and housing conditions).
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seen to lie in the opportunity it gave participants to come together to
discuss pending cases and long range strategies, and to compliment and
to criticize each other's work.
Similar conferences have been held at roughly five-year intervals,
with the most recent taking place at Washington and Lee University in
late 1979. By combining practitioners and academics, they are a
clearinghouse for ideas that should result in a more orderly develop-
ment of human rights law in domestic courts, as well as improved rec-
ognition of human rights issues in the law schools and their journals.
While the years since the landmark court of appeals decision in Fi-
lartiga have seen some setbacks, most participants felt that such recent
events have increased the importance of broad cooperation and coordi-
nation of human rights lawyers. As the conference chairman stated, "If
we have served to focus and to improve the quality of argument in even
a single lawsuit involving human rights norms, we have performed a
valuable function. But even if the only result of the conference is to
prevent some poorly conceived action from being brought and from
damaging the gains the participants have achieved before, we will have
succeded."
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